Bistable Probabilities: A Unified Framework for Studying Rationality and
Irrationality in Classical and Quantum Games
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2004.03474v1
- Date: Sat, 4 Apr 2020 12:41:39 GMT
- Title: Bistable Probabilities: A Unified Framework for Studying Rationality and
Irrationality in Classical and Quantum Games
- Abstract summary: Bistable probabilities are proposed as a principled and straight forward means for modeling irrational decision making in games.
It was found that up to three Nash equilibria exist for all three classical bistable games and maximal utility was attained when agents were rational.
Up to three Nash equilibria exist for all three quantum bistable games, however, utility was shown to increase according to higher levels of agent irrationality.
- Score: 0.8924669503280334
- License: http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
- Abstract: This article presents a unified probabilistic framework that allows both
rational and irrational decision making to be theoretically investigated and
simulated in classical and quantum games. Rational choice theory is a basic
component of game theoretic models, which assumes that a decision maker chooses
the best action according to their preferences. In this article, we define
irrationality as a deviation from a rational choice. Bistable probabilities are
proposed as a principled and straight forward means for modeling irrational
decision making in games. Bistable variants of classical and quantum Prisoner's
Dilemma, Stag Hunt and Chicken are analyzed in order to assess the effect of
irrationality on agent utility and Nash equilibria. It was found that up to
three Nash equilibria exist for all three classical bistable games and maximal
utility was attained when agents were rational. Up to three Nash equilibria
exist for all three quantum bistable games, however, utility was shown to
increase according to higher levels of agent irrationality.
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