Moore's Paradox and the logic of belief
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2006.11363v1
- Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2020 20:41:19 GMT
- Title: Moore's Paradox and the logic of belief
- Authors: Andr\'es P\'aez
- Abstract summary: Moores Paradox is a test case for any formal theory of belief.
I argue that Hintikkas interpretation of one of the doxastic operators is philosophically problematic.
- Score: 0.0
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: Moores Paradox is a test case for any formal theory of belief. In Knowledge
and Belief, Hintikka developed a multimodal logic for statements that express
sentences containing the epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. His account
purports to offer an explanation of the paradox. In this paper I argue that
Hintikkas interpretation of one of the doxastic operators is philosophically
problematic and leads to an unnecessarily strong logical system. I offer a
weaker alternative that captures in a more accurate way our logical intuitions
about the notion of belief without sacrificing the possibility of providing an
explanation for problematic cases such as Moores Paradox.
Related papers
- Empowering LLMs with Logical Reasoning: A Comprehensive Survey [49.91445266392609]
Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable successes on various tasks.<n>Recent studies have found that there are still significant challenges to the logical reasoning abilities of LLMs.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2025-02-21T18:20:35Z) - A logic for reasoning with inconsistent knowledge -- A reformulation using nowadays terminology (2024) [0.0]
This paper describes a logic for reasoning with inconsistent knowledge.
A reliability relation is used to choose between incompatible assumptions.
As long as no contradiction is derived, the knowledge is assumed to be consistent.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2024-11-15T13:53:05Z) - A refined Frauchiger--Renner paradox based on strong contextuality [0.0]
We observe that logical contextuality is the key ingredient of the FR paradox.
We propose a natural extension of Peres's dictum to resolve these extended Wigner's friend paradoxes.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2024-09-09T10:36:47Z) - Interpretability Needs a New Paradigm [49.134097841837715]
Interpretability is the study of explaining models in understandable terms to humans.
At the core of this debate is how each paradigm ensures its explanations are faithful, i.e., true to the model's behavior.
This paper's position is that we should think about new paradigms while staying vigilant regarding faithfulness.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2024-05-08T19:31:06Z) - Logic meets Wigner's Friend (and their Friends) [49.1574468325115]
We take a fresh look at Wigner's Friend thought-experiment and some of its more recent variants and extensions.
We discuss various solutions proposed in the literature, focusing on a few questions.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2023-07-04T13:31:56Z) - Language Models with Rationality [57.37201135072838]
Large language models (LLMs) are proficient at question-answering (QA)
It is not always clear how (or even if) an answer follows from their latent "beliefs"
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2023-05-23T17:04:25Z) - Maieutic Prompting: Logically Consistent Reasoning with Recursive
Explanations [71.2950434944196]
We develop Maieutic Prompting, which infers a correct answer to a question even from the noisy and inconsistent generations of language models.
Maieutic Prompting achieves up to 20% better accuracy than state-of-the-art prompting methods.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2022-05-24T06:36:42Z) - Transfinite Modal Logic: a Semi-quantitative Explanation for Bayesian
Reasoning [1.6916260027701393]
We introduce transfinite modal logic, which combines modal logic with ordinal arithmetic.
We suggest that transfinite modal logic captures the essence of Bayesian reasoning in a rather clear and simple form.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2022-04-02T17:58:14Z) - Surreal Decisions [0.0]
We argue that the use of John Conway's surreal numbers shall provide a firm mathematical foundation for transfinite decision theory.
We then bring our theory to bear on one of the more venerable decision problems in the literature: Pascal's Wager.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2021-10-23T18:37:20Z) - Logical Neural Networks [51.46602187496816]
We propose a novel framework seamlessly providing key properties of both neural nets (learning) and symbolic logic (knowledge and reasoning)
Every neuron has a meaning as a component of a formula in a weighted real-valued logic, yielding a highly intepretable disentangled representation.
Inference is omni rather than focused on predefined target variables, and corresponds to logical reasoning.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2020-06-23T16:55:45Z) - Non-Boolean Hidden Variables model reproduces Quantum Mechanics'
predictions for Bell's experiment [91.3755431537592]
Theory aimed to violate Bell's inequalities must start by giving up Boolean logic.
"Hard" problem is to predict the time values when single particles are detected.
"Soft" problem is to explain the violation of Bell's inequalities within (non-Boolean) Local Realism.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2020-05-20T21:46:35Z) - Epistemic Phase Transitions in Mathematical Proofs [0.0]
We show that under a cognitively-plausible belief formation mechanism, belief in mathematical arguments can undergo a dramatic and rapidly-propagating jump from uncertainty to near-complete confidence at reasonable levels of claim-to-claim error rates.
Our results bear both on recent work in the history and philosophy of mathematics on how we understand proofs, and on a question, basic to cognitive science, of how we justify complex beliefs.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2020-03-31T18:39:56Z)
This list is automatically generated from the titles and abstracts of the papers in this site.
This site does not guarantee the quality of this site (including all information) and is not responsible for any consequences.