Survival of the strictest: Stable and unstable equilibria under regularized learning with partial information

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2101.04667v2
• Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2021 14:45:34 GMT
• Title: Survival of the strictest: Stable and unstable equilibria under regularized learning with partial information
• Authors: Angeliki Giannou, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Panayotis Mertikopoulos
• Abstract summary: We examine the Nash equilibrium convergence properties of no-regret learning in general N-player games. We establish a comprehensive equivalence between the stability of a Nash equilibrium and its support. It provides a clear refinement criterion for the prediction of the day-to-day behavior of no-regret learning in games.
• Score: 32.384868685390906
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: In this paper, we examine the Nash equilibrium convergence properties of no-regret learning in general N-player games. For concreteness, we focus on the archetypal follow the regularized leader (FTRL) family of algorithms, and we consider the full spectrum of uncertainty that the players may encounter - from noisy, oracle-based feedback, to bandit, payoff-based information. In this general context, we establish a comprehensive equivalence between the stability of a Nash equilibrium and its support: a Nash equilibrium is stable and attracting with arbitrarily high probability if and only if it is strict (i.e., each equilibrium strategy has a unique best response). This equivalence extends existing continuous-time versions of the folk theorem of evolutionary game theory to a bona fide algorithmic learning setting, and it provides a clear refinement criterion for the prediction of the day-to-day behavior of no-regret learning in games

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