Making Paper Reviewing Robust to Bid Manipulation Attacks

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2102.06020v1
• Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2021 21:24:16 GMT
• Title: Making Paper Reviewing Robust to Bid Manipulation Attacks
• Authors: Ruihan Wu, Chuan Guo, Felix Wu, Rahul Kidambi, Laurens van der Maaten, Kilian Q. Weinberger
• Abstract summary: Anecdotal evidence suggests that some reviewers bid on papers by "friends" or colluding authors. We develop a novel approach for paper bidding and assignment that is much more robust against such attacks. In addition to being more robust, the quality of our paper review assignments is comparable to that of current, non-robust assignment approaches.
• Score: 44.34601846490532
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Most computer science conferences rely on paper bidding to assign reviewers to papers. Although paper bidding enables high-quality assignments in days of unprecedented submission numbers, it also opens the door for dishonest reviewers to adversarially influence paper reviewing assignments. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some reviewers bid on papers by "friends" or colluding authors, even though these papers are outside their area of expertise, and recommend them for acceptance without considering the merit of the work. In this paper, we study the efficacy of such bid manipulation attacks and find that, indeed, they can jeopardize the integrity of the review process. We develop a novel approach for paper bidding and assignment that is much more robust against such attacks. We show empirically that our approach provides robustness even when dishonest reviewers collude, have full knowledge of the assignment system's internal workings, and have access to the system's inputs. In addition to being more robust, the quality of our paper review assignments is comparable to that of current, non-robust assignment approaches.

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