Mixed Nash Equilibria in the Adversarial Examples Game

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2102.06905v1
• Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2021 11:47:20 GMT
• Title: Mixed Nash Equilibria in the Adversarial Examples Game
• Authors: Laurent Meunier, Meyer Scetbon, Rafael Pinot, Jamal Atif, Yann Chevaleyre
• Abstract summary: This paper tackles the problem of adversarial examples from a game theoretic point of view. We study the open question of the existence of mixed Nash equilibria in the zero-sum game formed by the attacker and the classifier.
• Score: 18.181826693937776
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: This paper tackles the problem of adversarial examples from a game theoretic point of view. We study the open question of the existence of mixed Nash equilibria in the zero-sum game formed by the attacker and the classifier. While previous works usually allow only one player to use randomized strategies, we show the necessity of considering randomization for both the classifier and the attacker. We demonstrate that this game has no duality gap, meaning that it always admits approximate Nash equilibria. We also provide the first optimization algorithms to learn a mixture of classifiers that approximately realizes the value of this game, \emph{i.e.} procedures to build an optimally robust randomized classifier.

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