Computation and Bribery of Voting Power in Delegative Simple Games

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2104.03692v1
• Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2021 11:28:50 GMT
• Title: Computation and Bribery of Voting Power in Delegative Simple Games
• Authors: Gianlorenzo D'Angelo, Esmaeil Delfaraz and Hugo Gilbert
• Abstract summary: We propose a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to compute the delegative Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik values in delegative simple games. We then investigate a bribery problem where the goal is to maximize/minimize the voting power/weight of a given voter in a delegation graph by changing at most a fixed number of delegations.
• Score: 12.259540948639327
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
• Abstract: Weighted voting games is one of the most important classes of cooperative games. Recently, Zhang and Grossi [53] proposed a variant of this class, called delegative simple games, which is well suited to analyse the relative importance of each voter in liquid democracy elections. Moreover, they defined a power index, called the delagative Banzhaf index to compute the importance of each agent (i.e., both voters and delegators) in a delegation graph based on two key parameters: the total voting weight she has accumulated and the structure of supports she receives from her delegators. We obtain several results related to delegative simple games. We first propose a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm to compute the delegative Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik values in delegative simple games. We then investigate a bribery problem where the goal is to maximize/minimize the voting power/weight of a given voter in a delegation graph by changing at most a fixed number of delegations. We show that the problems of minimizing/maximizing a voter's power index value are strongly NP-hard. Furthermore, we prove that having a better approximation guarantee than $1-1/e$ to maximize the voting weight of a voter is not possible, unless $P = NP$, then we provide some parameterized complexity results for this problem. Finally, we show that finding a delegation graph with a given number of gurus that maximizes the minimum power index value an agent can have is a computationally hard problem.

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