On the Convergence of Fictitious Play: A Decomposition Approach
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2205.01469v1
- Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 13:04:09 GMT
- Title: On the Convergence of Fictitious Play: A Decomposition Approach
- Authors: Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Chenchen Li, David Mguni, Jun Wang, Xiang
Yan, Yaodong Yang
- Abstract summary: We extend the convergence results of Fictitious Play (FP) to the combinations of such games and beyond.
We develop a linear relationship unifying cooperation and competition in the sense that these two classes of games are mutually transferable.
We analyze a non-convergent example of FP, the Shapley game, and develop sufficient conditions for FP to converge.
- Score: 17.607284715519587
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Abstract: Fictitious play (FP) is one of the most fundamental game-theoretical learning
frameworks for computing Nash equilibrium in $n$-player games, which builds the
foundation for modern multi-agent learning algorithms. Although FP has provable
convergence guarantees on zero-sum games and potential games, many real-world
problems are often a mixture of both and the convergence property of FP has not
been fully studied yet. In this paper, we extend the convergence results of FP
to the combinations of such games and beyond. Specifically, we derive new
conditions for FP to converge by leveraging game decomposition techniques. We
further develop a linear relationship unifying cooperation and competition in
the sense that these two classes of games are mutually transferable. Finally,
we analyze a non-convergent example of FP, the Shapley game, and develop
sufficient conditions for FP to converge.
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