EVHA: Explainable Vision System for Hardware Testing and Assurance -- An Overview

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2207.09627v1
• Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 02:58:46 GMT
• Title: EVHA: Explainable Vision System for Hardware Testing and Assurance -- An Overview
• Authors: Md Mahfuz Al Hasan, Mohammad Tahsin Mostafiz, Thomas An Le, Jake Julia, Nidish Vashistha, Shayan Taheri, and Navid Asadizanjani
• Abstract summary: We propose Explainable Vision System for Hardware Testing and Assurance (EVHA) in this work. EVHA can detect the smallest possible change to a design in a low-cost, accurate, and fast manner. This article provides an overview on the design, development, implementation, and analysis of our defense system.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Due to the ever-growing demands for electronic chips in different sectors the semiconductor companies have been mandated to offshore their manufacturing processes. This unwanted matter has made security and trustworthiness of their fabricated chips concerning and caused creation of hardware attacks. In this condition, different entities in the semiconductor supply chain can act maliciously and execute an attack on the design computing layers, from devices to systems. Our attack is a hardware Trojan that is inserted during mask generation/fabrication in an untrusted foundry. The Trojan leaves a footprint in the fabricated through addition, deletion, or change of design cells. In order to tackle this problem, we propose Explainable Vision System for Hardware Testing and Assurance (EVHA) in this work that can detect the smallest possible change to a design in a low-cost, accurate, and fast manner. The inputs to this system are Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) images acquired from the Integrated Circuits (ICs) under examination. The system output is determination of IC status in terms of having any defect and/or hardware Trojan through addition, deletion, or change in the design cells at the cell-level. This article provides an overview on the design, development, implementation, and analysis of our defense system.

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