LOKI: Large-scale Data Reconstruction Attack against Federated Learning through Model Manipulation

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2303.12233v2
• Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2023 15:00:22 GMT
• Title: LOKI: Large-scale Data Reconstruction Attack against Federated Learning through Model Manipulation
• Authors: Joshua C. Zhao, Atul Sharma, Ahmed Roushdy Elkordy, Yahya H. Ezzeldin, Salman Avestimehr, Saurabh Bagchi
• Abstract summary: We introduce LOKI, an attack that overcomes previous limitations and also breaks the anonymity of aggregation. With FedAVG and aggregation across 100 clients, prior work can leak less than 1% of images on MNIST, CIFAR-100, and Tiny ImageNet. Using only a single training round, LOKI is able to leak 76-86% of all data samples.
• Score: 25.03733882637947
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Federated learning was introduced to enable machine learning over large decentralized datasets while promising privacy by eliminating the need for data sharing. Despite this, prior work has shown that shared gradients often contain private information and attackers can gain knowledge either through malicious modification of the architecture and parameters or by using optimization to approximate user data from the shared gradients. However, prior data reconstruction attacks have been limited in setting and scale, as most works target FedSGD and limit the attack to single-client gradients. Many of these attacks fail in the more practical setting of FedAVG or if updates are aggregated together using secure aggregation. Data reconstruction becomes significantly more difficult, resulting in limited attack scale and/or decreased reconstruction quality. When both FedAVG and secure aggregation are used, there is no current method that is able to attack multiple clients concurrently in a federated learning setting. In this work we introduce LOKI, an attack that overcomes previous limitations and also breaks the anonymity of aggregation as the leaked data is identifiable and directly tied back to the clients they come from. Our design sends clients customized convolutional parameters, and the weight gradients of data points between clients remain separate even through aggregation. With FedAVG and aggregation across 100 clients, prior work can leak less than 1% of images on MNIST, CIFAR-100, and Tiny ImageNet. Using only a single training round, LOKI is able to leak 76-86% of all data samples.

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