Fair and Inclusive Participatory Budgeting: Voter Experience with Cumulative and Quadratic Voting Interfaces

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2308.04345v2
• Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2023 11:29:46 GMT
• Title: Fair and Inclusive Participatory Budgeting: Voter Experience with Cumulative and Quadratic Voting Interfaces
• Authors: Thomas Wellings, Fatemeh Banaie Heravan, Abhinav Sharma, Lodewijk Gelauff, Regula H\"anggli Fricker, Evangelos Pournaras
• Abstract summary: Cumulative and quadratic voting are expressive, promoting fairness and inclusion. Despite these benefits, graphical voter interfaces for cumulative and quadratic voting are complex to implement and use effectively. This paper introduces an implementation and evaluation of cumulative and quadratic voting within a state-of-the-art voting platform: Stanford Participatory Budgeting.
• Score: 1.4730691320093603
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Cumulative and quadratic voting are two distributional voting methods that are expressive, promoting fairness and inclusion, particularly in the realm of participatory budgeting. Despite these benefits, graphical voter interfaces for cumulative and quadratic voting are complex to implement and use effectively. As a result, such methods have not seen yet widespread adoption on digital voting platforms. This paper addresses the challenge by introducing an implementation and evaluation of cumulative and quadratic voting within a state-of-the-art voting platform: Stanford Participatory Budgeting. The findings of the study show that while voters prefer simple methods, the more expressive (and complex) cumulative voting becomes the preferred one compared to k-ranking voting that is simpler but less expressive. The implemented voting interface elements are found useful and support the observed voters' preferences for more expressive voting methods. *

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