LeapFrog: The Rowhammer Instruction Skip Attack

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2404.07878v1
• Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2024 16:10:16 GMT
• Title: LeapFrog: The Rowhammer Instruction Skip Attack
• Authors: Andrew Adiletta, Caner Tol, Berk Sunar,
• Abstract summary: We present a new type of Rowhammer gadget, called a LeapFrog gadget, which allows an adversary to subvert code execution. The Leapfrog gadget manifests when the victim code stores the Program Counter (PC) value in the user or kernel stack. This research also presents a systematic process to identify Leapfrog gadgets.
• Score: 4.091772241106195
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
• Abstract: Since its inception, Rowhammer exploits have rapidly evolved into increasingly sophisticated threats not only compromising data integrity but also the control flow integrity of victim processes. Nevertheless, it remains a challenge for an attacker to identify vulnerable targets (i.e., Rowhammer gadgets), understand the outcome of the attempted fault, and formulate an attack that yields useful results. In this paper, we present a new type of Rowhammer gadget, called a LeapFrog gadget, which, when present in the victim code, allows an adversary to subvert code execution to bypass a critical piece of code (e.g., authentication check logic, encryption rounds, padding in security protocols). The Leapfrog gadget manifests when the victim code stores the Program Counter (PC) value in the user or kernel stack (e.g., a return address during a function call) which, when tampered with, re-positions the return address to a location that bypasses a security-critical code pattern. This research also presents a systematic process to identify Leapfrog gadgets. This methodology enables the automated detection of susceptible targets and the determination of optimal attack parameters. We first showcase this new attack vector through a practical demonstration on a TLS handshake client/server scenario, successfully inducing an instruction skip in a client application. We then demonstrate the attack on real-world code found in the wild, implementing an attack on OpenSSL. Our findings extend the impact of Rowhammer attacks on control flow and contribute to the development of more robust defenses against these increasingly sophisticated threats.

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