Fully Randomized Pointers

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.12513v1
• Date: Tue, 21 May 2024 05:54:27 GMT
• Title: Fully Randomized Pointers
• Authors: Gregory J. Duck, Sai Dhawal Phaye, Roland H. C. Yap, Trevor E. Carlson,
• Abstract summary: We propose Fully Randomized Pointers (FRP) as a stronger memory error defense that is resistant to even brute force attacks. The key idea is to fully randomize pointer bits -- as much as possible -- while also preserving binary compatibility. We show that FRP is secure, practical, and compatible at the binary level, while a hardware implementation can achieve low performance overheads.
• Score: 7.1754940591892735
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Software security continues to be a critical concern for programs implemented in low-level programming languages such as C and C++. Many defenses have been proposed in the current literature, each with different trade-offs including performance, compatibility, and attack resistance. One general class of defense is pointer randomization or authentication, where invalid object access (e.g., memory errors) is obfuscated or denied. Many defenses rely on the program termination (e.g., crashing) to abort attacks, with the implicit assumption that an adversary cannot "brute force" the defense with multiple attack attempts. However, such assumptions do not always hold, such as hardware speculative execution attacks or network servers configured to restart on error. In such cases, we argue that most existing defenses provide only weak effective security. In this paper, we propose Fully Randomized Pointers (FRP) as a stronger memory error defense that is resistant to even brute force attacks. The key idea is to fully randomize pointer bits -- as much as possible while also preserving binary compatibility -- rendering the relationships between pointers highly unpredictable. Furthermore, the very high degree of randomization renders brute force attacks impractical -- providing strong effective security compared to existing work. We design a new FRP encoding that is: (1) compatible with existing binary code (without recompilation); (2) decoupled from the underlying object layout; and (3) can be efficiently decoded on-the-fly to the underlying memory address. We prototype FRP in the form of a software implementation (BlueFat) to test security and compatibility, and a proof-of-concept hardware implementation (GreenFat) to evaluate performance. We show that FRP is secure, practical, and compatible at the binary level, while a hardware implementation can achieve low performance overheads (<10%).

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