An Industry Interview Study of Software Signing for Supply Chain Security

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.08198v1
• Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2024 13:30:53 GMT
• Title: An Industry Interview Study of Software Signing for Supply Chain Security
• Authors: Kelechi G. Kalu, Tanya Singla, Chinenye Okafor, Santiago Torres-Arias, James C. Davis,
• Abstract summary: Many cybersecurity frameworks, standards, and regulations recommend the use of software signing. Recent surveys have found that the adoption rate and quality of software signatures are low. We interviewed 18 high-ranking industry practitioners across 13 organizations.
• Score: 5.433194344896805
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Many software products are composed by the recursive integration of components from other teams or external parties. Each additional link in a software product's supply chain increases the risk of the injection of malicious behavior. To improve supply chain provenance, many cybersecurity frameworks, standards, and regulations recommend the use of software signing. However, recent surveys and measurement studies have found that the adoption rate and quality of software signatures are low. These findings raise questions about the practical application of software signing, the human factors influencing its adoption, and the challenges faced during its implementation. We lack in-depth industry perspectives on the challenges and practices of software signing. To understand software signing in practice, we interviewed 18 high-ranking industry practitioners across 13 organizations. We provide possible impacts of experienced software supply chain failures, security standards, and regulations on software signing adoption. We also study the challenges that affect an effective software signing implementation. To summarize our findings: (1) We present a refined model of the software supply chain factory model highlighting practitioner's signing practices; (2) We highlight the different challenges -- Technical, Organizational, and Human -- that hamper software signing implementation; (3) We report that expert subjects disagree on the importance of signing; (4) We describe how failure incidents and industry standards affect the adoption of software signing and other security techniques. Our findings contribute to the understanding of software supply chain security by highlighting the impact of human and organizational factors on Software Supply Chain risks and providing nuanced insights for effectively implementing Software Supply Chain security controls -- towards Software signing in practice.

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