Intelligo ut Confido: Understanding, Trust and User Experience in Verifiable Receipt-Free E-Voting (long version)

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.13240v1
• Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2024 07:49:39 GMT
• Title: Intelligo ut Confido: Understanding, Trust and User Experience in Verifiable Receipt-Free E-Voting (long version)
• Authors: Marie-Laure Zollinger, Peter B. Rønne, Steve Schneider, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Wojtek Jamroga,
• Abstract summary: We present a study with 300 participants which aims to evaluate the voters' experience of the receipt-freeness procedures in the e-voting protocol Selene. While the usability and trust factors were rated low in the experiments, we found a positive correlation between trust and understanding.
• Score: 1.306972554821087
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Voting protocols seek to provide integrity and vote privacy in elections. To achieve integrity, procedures have been proposed allowing voters to verify their vote - however this impacts both the user experience and privacy. Especially, vote verification can lead to vote-buying or coercion, if an attacker can obtain documentation, i.e. a receipt, of the cast vote. Thus, some voting protocols go further and provide mechanisms to prevent such receipts. To be effective, this so-called receipt-freeness depends on voters being able to understand and use these mechanisms. In this paper, we present a study with 300 participants which aims to evaluate the voters' experience of the receipt-freeness procedures in the e-voting protocol Selene in the context of vote-buying. This actually constitutes the first user study dealing with vote-buying in e-voting. While the usability and trust factors were rated low in the experiments, we found a positive correlation between trust and understanding.

Related papers

• MERGE: Matching Electronic Results with Genuine Evidence for verifiable voting in person at remote locations [2.206168301581203]
  We introduce the MERGE protocol to combine the speed of electronic ballot delivery with the reliability of paper returns. This protocol allows voters to submit an electronic record of their vote quickly while simultaneously mailing a paper ballot for verification. The electronic record can be used for preliminary results, but the paper ballot is used in a Risk Limiting Audit (RLA) if received in time, ensuring the integrity of the election.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-10-09T09:19:01Z)
• Beyond Persuasion: Towards Conversational Recommender System with Credible Explanations [63.05026345443155]
  We propose a simple yet effective method, called PC-CRS, to enhance the credibility of CRS's explanations during persuasion. Experimental results demonstrate the efficacy of PC-CRS in promoting persuasive and credible explanations. Further analysis reveals the reason behind current methods producing incredible explanations and the potential of credible explanations to improve recommendation accuracy.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-09-22T11:35:59Z)
• E-Vote Your Conscience: Perceptions of Coercion and Vote Buying, and the Usability of Fake Credentials in Online Voting [1.0721573281744934]
  Online voting is more susceptible to voter coercion and vote buying than in-person voting. One mitigation is to give voters fake voting credentials that they can yield to a coercer. Fake credentials appear identical to real ones, but cast votes that are silently omitted from the final tally.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-04-18T10:57:32Z)
• The Decisive Power of Indecision: Low-Variance Risk-Limiting Audits and Election Contestation via Marginal Mark Recording [51.82772358241505]
  Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) are techniques for verifying the outcomes of large elections. We define new families of audits that improve efficiency and offer advances in statistical power. New audits are enabled by revisiting the standard notion of a cast-vote record so that it can declare multiple possible mark interpretations.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-02-09T16:23:54Z)
• Adaptively Weighted Audits of Instant-Runoff Voting Elections: AWAIRE [61.872917066847855]
  Methods for auditing instant-runoff voting (IRV) elections are either not risk-limiting or require cast vote records (CVRs), the voting system's electronic record of the votes on each ballot. We develop an RLA method that uses adaptively weighted averages of test supermartingales to efficiently audit IRV elections when CVRs are not available.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2023-07-20T15:55:34Z)
• Private Multi-Winner Voting for Machine Learning [48.0093793427039]
  We propose three new DP multi-winner mechanisms: Binary, $tau$, and Powerset voting. Binary voting operates independently per label through composition. $tau$ voting bounds votes optimally in their $ell$ norm for tight data-independent guarantees. Powerset voting operates over the entire binary vector by viewing the possible outcomes as a power set.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2022-11-23T20:06:46Z)
• Towards Secure Virtual Elections: Multiparty Computation of Order Based Voting Rules [5.156484100374059]
  One of the main challenges in e-voting systems is to certify that the computed results are consistent with the cast ballots. We propose a secure voting protocol for elections governed by order-based voting rules. Our protocol offers perfect ballot secrecy, in the sense that it issues only the required output, while no other information on the cast ballots is revealed.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2022-05-21T12:17:21Z)
• TRIP: Trust-Limited Coercion-Resistant In-Person Voter Registration [1.0244919633049518]
  One promising mitigation strategy enables voters to give a coercer fake voting credentials, which silently cast votes that do not count. We present TRIP, the first voter registration scheme that addresses these challenges by leveraging the physical security of in-person interaction. Voters use a kiosk in a privacy booth to print real and fake paper credentials, which appear indistinguishable to others. For verifiability, each credential includes an interactive zero-knowledge proof, which is sound in real credentials and unsound in fake credentials.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2022-02-14T13:35:46Z)
• Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules [105.35249497503527]
  The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that no unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule is strategyproof. We revisit voting rules and consider a weaker notion of strategyproofness called not obvious manipulability.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2021-11-03T02:41:48Z)
• Bribery as a Measure of Candidate Success: Complexity Results for Approval-Based Multiwinner Rules [58.8640284079665]
  We study the problem of bribery in multiwinner elections, for the case where the voters cast approval ballots (i.e., sets of candidates they approve) We consider a number of approval-based multiwinner rules (AV, SAV, GAV, RAV, approval-based Chamberlin--Courant, and PAV) In general, our problems tend to be easier when we limit out bribery actions on increasing the number of approvals of the candidate that we want to be in a winning committee.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2021-04-19T08:26:40Z)
• Security Survey and Analysis of Vote-by-Mail Systems [0.0]
  We examine the security of electronic systems used in the process of voting by mail, including online voter registration and online ballot tracking systems. We find that online voter registration systems in some states have vulnerabilities that allow adversaries to alter or effectively prevent a voter's registration. We additionally find that ballot tracking systems raise serious privacy questions surrounding ease of access to voter data.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2020-05-18T02:18:15Z)

This list is automatically generated from the titles and abstracts of the papers in this site.

This site does not guarantee the quality of this site (including all information) and is not responsible for any consequences.