MINT: Securely Mitigating Rowhammer with a Minimalist In-DRAM Tracker

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.16038v1
• Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2024 20:29:56 GMT
• Title: MINT: Securely Mitigating Rowhammer with a Minimalist In-DRAM Tracker
• Authors: Moinuddin Qureshi, Salman Qazi, Aamer Jaleel,
• Abstract summary: This paper investigates secure low-cost in-DRAM trackers for mitigating Rowhammer (RH) Existing low-cost in-DRAM trackers require impractical overheads of hundreds or thousands of entries per bank. We propose a Minimalist In-DRAM Tracker (MINT), which provides secure mitigation with just a single entry.
• Score: 0.9939073004351231
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: This paper investigates secure low-cost in-DRAM trackers for mitigating Rowhammer (RH). In-DRAM solutions have the advantage that they can solve the RH problem within the DRAM chip, without relying on other parts of the system. However, in-DRAM mitigation suffers from two key challenges: First, the mitigations are synchronized with refresh, which means we cannot mitigate at arbitrary times. Second, the SRAM area available for aggressor tracking is severely limited, to only a few bytes. Existing low-cost in-DRAM trackers (such as TRR) have been broken by well-crafted access patterns, whereas prior counter-based schemes require impractical overheads of hundreds or thousands of entries per bank. The goal of our paper is to develop an ultra low-cost secure in-DRAM tracker. Our solution is based on a simple observation: if only one row can be mitigated at refresh, then we should ideally need to track only one row. We propose a Minimalist In-DRAM Tracker (MINT), which provides secure mitigation with just a single entry. At each refresh, MINT probabilistically decides which activation in the upcoming interval will be selected for mitigation at the next refresh. MINT provides guaranteed protection against classic single and double-sided attacks. We also derive the minimum RH threshold (MinTRH) tolerated by MINT across all patterns. MINT has a MinTRH of 1482 which can be lowered to 356 with RFM. The MinTRH of MINT is lower than a prior counter-based design with 677 entries per bank, and is within 2x of the MinTRH of an idealized design that stores one-counter-per-row. We also analyze the impact of refresh postponement on the MinTRH of low-cost in-DRAM trackers, and propose an efficient solution to make such trackers compatible with refresh postponement.

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