In-Context Exploiter for Extensive-Form Games

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2408.05575v1
• Date: Sat, 10 Aug 2024 14:59:09 GMT
• Title: In-Context Exploiter for Extensive-Form Games
• Authors: Shuxin Li, Chang Yang, Youzhi Zhang, Pengdeng Li, Xinrun Wang, Xiao Huang, Hau Chan, Bo An,
• Abstract summary: We introduce a novel method, In-Context Exploiter (ICE), to train a single model that can act as any player in the game and adaptively exploit opponents entirely by in-context learning. Our ICE algorithm involves generating diverse opponent strategies, collecting interactive history data by a reinforcement learning algorithm, and training a transformer-based agent within a well-designed curriculum learning framework.
• Score: 38.24471816329584
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Nash equilibrium (NE) is a widely adopted solution concept in game theory due to its stability property. However, we observe that the NE strategy might not always yield the best results, especially against opponents who do not adhere to NE strategies. Based on this observation, we pose a new game-solving question: Can we learn a model that can exploit any, even NE, opponent to maximize their own utility? In this work, we make the first attempt to investigate this problem through in-context learning. Specifically, we introduce a novel method, In-Context Exploiter (ICE), to train a single model that can act as any player in the game and adaptively exploit opponents entirely by in-context learning. Our ICE algorithm involves generating diverse opponent strategies, collecting interactive history training data by a reinforcement learning algorithm, and training a transformer-based agent within a well-designed curriculum learning framework. Finally, comprehensive experimental results validate the effectiveness of our ICE algorithm, showcasing its in-context learning ability to exploit any unknown opponent, thereby positively answering our initial game-solving question.

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