ARSecure: A Novel End-to-End Encryption Messaging System Using Augmented Reality

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2409.04457v1
• Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2024 16:39:43 GMT
• Title: ARSecure: A Novel End-to-End Encryption Messaging System Using Augmented Reality
• Authors: Hamish Alsop, Douglas Alsop, Joseph Solomon, Liam Aumento, Mark Butters, Cameron Millar, Yagmur Yigit, Leandros Maglaras, Naghmeh Moradpoor,
• Abstract summary: We introduce ARSecure, a novel end-to-end encryption messaging solution utilizing augmented reality glasses. ARSecure allows users to encrypt and decrypt their messages before they reach their phone devices, effectively countering the CSS technology in E2EE systems.
• Score: 0.28087862620958753
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: End-to-End Encryption (E2EE) ensures that only the intended recipient(s) can read messages. Popular instant messaging (IM) applications such as Signal, WhatsApp, Apple's iMessage, and Telegram claim to offer E2EE. However, client-side scanning (CSS) undermines these claims by scanning all messages, including text, images, audio, and video files, on both sending and receiving ends. Industry and government parties support CSS to combat harmful content such as child pornography, terrorism, and other illegal activities. In this paper, we introduce ARSecure, a novel end-to-end encryption messaging solution utilizing augmented reality glasses. ARSecure allows users to encrypt and decrypt their messages before they reach their phone devices, effectively countering the CSS technology in E2EE systems.

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