Backdooring Vision-Language Models with Out-Of-Distribution Data

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.01264v1
• Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2024 06:21:00 GMT
• Title: Backdooring Vision-Language Models with Out-Of-Distribution Data
• Authors: Weimin Lyu, Jiachen Yao, Saumya Gupta, Lu Pang, Tao Sun, Lingjie Yi, Lijie Hu, Haibin Ling, Chao Chen,
• Abstract summary: Vision-Language Models (VLMs) generate detailed text descriptions from visual inputs. Despite their growing importance, the security of VLMs, particularly against backdoor attacks, is under explored. We introduce VLOOD (Backdooring Vision-Language Models with Out-of-Distribution Data), a novel approach with two key contributions.
• Score: 44.40928756056506
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: The emergence of Vision-Language Models (VLMs) represents a significant advancement in integrating computer vision with Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate detailed text descriptions from visual inputs. Despite their growing importance, the security of VLMs, particularly against backdoor attacks, is under explored. Moreover, prior works often assume attackers have access to the original training data, which is often unrealistic. In this paper, we address a more practical and challenging scenario where attackers must rely solely on Out-Of-Distribution (OOD) data. We introduce VLOOD (Backdooring Vision-Language Models with Out-of-Distribution Data), a novel approach with two key contributions: (1) demonstrating backdoor attacks on VLMs in complex image-to-text tasks while minimizing degradation of the original semantics under poisoned inputs, and (2) proposing innovative techniques for backdoor injection without requiring any access to the original training data. Our evaluation on image captioning and visual question answering (VQA) tasks confirms the effectiveness of VLOOD, revealing a critical security vulnerability in VLMs and laying the foundation for future research on securing multimodal models against sophisticated threats.

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