Exploiting HDMI and USB Ports for GPU Side-Channel Insights

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.02539v1
• Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2024 14:44:15 GMT
• Title: Exploiting HDMI and USB Ports for GPU Side-Channel Insights
• Abstract summary: This paper presents a new class of attacks that exploit power consumption patterns at USB and HDMI ports to infer GPU activities. We develop a custom device that plugs into these ports and demonstrate that its high-resolution power measurements can drive successful inferences about GPU processes. Our findings underscore the need to reevaluate and strengthen the current generation of HDMI and USB port security defenses.
• Score: 0.9208007322096533
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Modern computers rely on USB and HDMI ports for connecting external peripherals and display devices. Despite their built-in security measures, these ports remain susceptible to passive power-based side-channel attacks. This paper presents a new class of attacks that exploit power consumption patterns at these ports to infer GPU activities. We develop a custom device that plugs into these ports and demonstrate that its high-resolution power measurements can drive successful inferences about GPU processes, such as neural network computations and video rendering. The ubiquitous presence of USB and HDMI ports allows for discreet placement of the device, and its non-interference with data channels ensures that no security alerts are triggered. Our findings underscore the need to reevaluate and strengthen the current generation of HDMI and USB port security defenses.

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