HoneypotNet: Backdoor Attacks Against Model Extraction

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2501.01090v1
• Date: Thu, 02 Jan 2025 06:23:51 GMT
• Title: HoneypotNet: Backdoor Attacks Against Model Extraction
• Authors: Yixu Wang, Tianle Gu, Yan Teng, Yingchun Wang, Xingjun Ma,
• Abstract summary: Model extraction attacks pose severe security threats to production models and ML platforms. We introduce a new defense paradigm called attack as defense which modifies the model's output to be poisonous. HoneypotNet can inject backdoors into substitute models with a high success rate.
• Score: 24.603590328055027
• License:
• Abstract: Model extraction attacks are one type of inference-time attacks that approximate the functionality and performance of a black-box victim model by launching a certain number of queries to the model and then leveraging the model's predictions to train a substitute model. These attacks pose severe security threats to production models and MLaaS platforms and could cause significant monetary losses to the model owners. A body of work has proposed to defend machine learning models against model extraction attacks, including both active defense methods that modify the model's outputs or increase the query overhead to avoid extraction and passive defense methods that detect malicious queries or leverage watermarks to perform post-verification. In this work, we introduce a new defense paradigm called attack as defense which modifies the model's output to be poisonous such that any malicious users that attempt to use the output to train a substitute model will be poisoned. To this end, we propose a novel lightweight backdoor attack method dubbed HoneypotNet that replaces the classification layer of the victim model with a honeypot layer and then fine-tunes the honeypot layer with a shadow model (to simulate model extraction) via bi-level optimization to modify its output to be poisonous while remaining the original performance. We empirically demonstrate on four commonly used benchmark datasets that HoneypotNet can inject backdoors into substitute models with a high success rate. The injected backdoor not only facilitates ownership verification but also disrupts the functionality of substitute models, serving as a significant deterrent to model extraction attacks.

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