Geneshift: Impact of different scenario shift on Jailbreaking LLM
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2504.08104v1
- Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2025 20:02:35 GMT
- Title: Geneshift: Impact of different scenario shift on Jailbreaking LLM
- Authors: Tianyi Wu, Zhiwei Xue, Yue Liu, Jiaheng Zhang, Bryan Hooi, See-Kiong Ng,
- Abstract summary: We propose a black-box jailbreak attack termed GeneShift, by using a genetic algorithm to optimize the scenario shifts.<n>We show that GeneShift increases the jailbreak success rate from 0% to 60% when direct prompting alone would fail.
- Score: 55.26229741296822
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Abstract: Jailbreak attacks, which aim to cause LLMs to perform unrestricted behaviors, have become a critical and challenging direction in AI safety. Despite achieving the promising attack success rate using dictionary-based evaluation, existing jailbreak attack methods fail to output detailed contents to satisfy the harmful request, leading to poor performance on GPT-based evaluation. To this end, we propose a black-box jailbreak attack termed GeneShift, by using a genetic algorithm to optimize the scenario shifts. Firstly, we observe that the malicious queries perform optimally under different scenario shifts. Based on it, we develop a genetic algorithm to evolve and select the hybrid of scenario shifts. It guides our method to elicit detailed and actionable harmful responses while keeping the seemingly benign facade, improving stealthiness. Extensive experiments demonstrate the superiority of GeneShift. Notably, GeneShift increases the jailbreak success rate from 0% to 60% when direct prompting alone would fail.
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