Multiple Proposer Transaction Fee Mechanism Design: Robust Incentives Against Censorship and Bribery

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2505.13751v1
• Date: Mon, 19 May 2025 21:53:58 GMT
• Title: Multiple Proposer Transaction Fee Mechanism Design: Robust Incentives Against Censorship and Bribery
• Authors: Aikaterini-Panagiota Stouka, Julian Ma, Thomas Thiery,
• Abstract summary: This study explores how multiple proposers should be rewarded to incentivize censorship resistance.<n>Main contribution is the identification of TFMs that ensure censorship resistance under bribery attacks.<n>We provide a concrete payment mechanism for FOCIL, along with generalizable contributions to the literature.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Censorship resistance is one of the core value proposition of blockchains. A recurring design pattern aimed at providing censorship resistance is enabling multiple proposers to contribute inputs into block construction. Notably, Fork-Choice Enforced Inclusion Lists (FOCIL) is proposed to be included in Ethereum. However, the current proposal relies on altruistic behavior, without a Transaction Fee Mechanism (TFM). This study aims to address this gap by exploring how multiple proposers should be rewarded to incentivize censorship resistance. The main contribution of this work is the identification of TFMs that ensure censorship resistance under bribery attacks, while also satisfying the incentive compatibility properties of EIP-1559. We provide a concrete payment mechanism for FOCIL, along with generalizable contributions to the literature by analyzing 1) incentive compatibility of TFMs in the presence of a bribing adversary, 2) TFMs in protocols with multiple phases of transaction inclusion, and 3) TFMs of protocols in which parties are uncertain about the behavior and the possible bribe of others.

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