From Average-Iterate to Last-Iterate Convergence in Games: A Reduction and Its Applications

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2506.03464v1
• Date: Wed, 04 Jun 2025 00:24:14 GMT
• Title: From Average-Iterate to Last-Iterate Convergence in Games: A Reduction and Its Applications
• Authors: Yang Cai, Haipeng Luo, Chen-Yu Wei, Weiqiang Zheng,
• Abstract summary: We show that for a large family of games, there exists a simple black-box reduction that transforms the average iterates of an uncoupled learning dynamics into the last iterates of a new uncoupled learning dynamics.<n>We obtain new state-of-the-art last-iterate convergence rates for uncoupled learning dynamics in two-player zero-sum normal-form games.
• Score: 44.95137108337898
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: The convergence of online learning algorithms in games under self-play is a fundamental question in game theory and machine learning. Among various notions of convergence, last-iterate convergence is particularly desirable, as it reflects the actual decisions made by the learners and captures the day-to-day behavior of the learning dynamics. While many algorithms are known to converge in the average-iterate, achieving last-iterate convergence typically requires considerably more effort in both the design and the analysis of the algorithm. Somewhat surprisingly, we show in this paper that for a large family of games, there exists a simple black-box reduction that transforms the average iterates of an uncoupled learning dynamics into the last iterates of a new uncoupled learning dynamics, thus also providing a reduction from last-iterate convergence to average-iterate convergence. Our reduction applies to games where each player's utility is linear in both their own strategy and the joint strategy of all opponents. This family includes two-player bimatrix games and generalizations such as multi-player polymatrix games. By applying our reduction to the Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Update algorithm, we obtain new state-of-the-art last-iterate convergence rates for uncoupled learning dynamics in two-player zero-sum normal-form games: (1) an $O(\frac{\log d}{T})$ last-iterate convergence rate under gradient feedback, representing an exponential improvement in the dependence on the dimension $d$ (i.e., the maximum number of actions available to either player); and (2) an $\widetilde{O}(d^{\frac{1}{5}} T^{-\frac{1}{5}})$ last-iterate convergence rate under bandit feedback, improving upon the previous best rates of $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{d} T^{-\frac{1}{8}})$ and $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{d} T^{-\frac{1}{6}})$.

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