Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2506.08438v1
• Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2025 04:25:04 GMT
• Title: Learning to Lead: Incentivizing Strategic Agents in the Dark
• Authors: Yuchen Wu, Xinyi Zhong, Zhuoran Yang,
• Abstract summary: We study an online learning version of the generalized principal-agent model.<n>We develop the first provably sample-efficient algorithm for this challenging setting.<n>We establish a near optimal $tildeO(sqrtT) $ regret bound for learning the principal's optimal policy.
• Score: 50.93875404941184
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: We study an online learning version of the generalized principal-agent model, where a principal interacts repeatedly with a strategic agent possessing private types, private rewards, and taking unobservable actions. The agent is non-myopic, optimizing a discounted sum of future rewards and may strategically misreport types to manipulate the principal's learning. The principal, observing only her own realized rewards and the agent's reported types, aims to learn an optimal coordination mechanism that minimizes strategic regret. We develop the first provably sample-efficient algorithm for this challenging setting. Our approach features a novel pipeline that combines (i) a delaying mechanism to incentivize approximately myopic agent behavior, (ii) an innovative reward angle estimation framework that uses sector tests and a matching procedure to recover type-dependent reward functions, and (iii) a pessimistic-optimistic LinUCB algorithm that enables the principal to explore efficiently while respecting the agent's incentive constraints. We establish a near optimal $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T}) $ regret bound for learning the principal's optimal policy, where $\tilde{O}(\cdot) $ omits logarithmic factors. Our results open up new avenues for designing robust online learning algorithms for a wide range of game-theoretic settings involving private types and strategic agents.

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