The Rich Get Richer in Bitcoin Mining Induced by Blockchain Forks

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2506.13360v1
• Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2025 11:03:50 GMT
• Title: The Rich Get Richer in Bitcoin Mining Induced by Blockchain Forks
• Authors: Akira Sakurai, Kazuyuki Shudo,
• Abstract summary: Fairness in the distribution of mining rewards plays a crucial role in preventing the concentration of computational power in a few miners.<n>If miners with greater computational resources receive disproportionately higher rewards, it indicates a threat to the system's decentralization.<n>This study analyzes TRGR in Bitcoin by focusing on unintentional blockchain forks.
• Score: 2.9281463284266973
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Bitcoin is a representative decentralized currency system. For the security of Bitcoin, fairness in the distribution of mining rewards plays a crucial role in preventing the concentration of computational power in a few miners. Here, fairness refers to the distribution of block rewards in proportion to contributed computational resources. If miners with greater computational resources receive disproportionately higher rewards, i.e., if the Rich Get Richer (TRGR) phenomenon holds in Bitcoin, it indicates a threat to the system's decentralization. This study analyzes TRGR in Bitcoin by focusing on unintentional blockchain forks, an inherent phenomenon in Bitcoin. Previous research has failed to provide generalizable insights due to the low precision of their analytical methods. In contrast, we avoid this problem by adopting a method whose analytical precision has been empirically validated. The primary contribution of this work is a theoretical analysis that clearly demonstrates TRGR in Bitcoin under the assumption of fixed block propagation delays between different miners. More specifically, we show that the mining profit rate depends linearly on the proportion of hashrate. Furthermore, we examine the robustness of this result from multiple perspectives in scenarios where block propagation delays between different miners are not necessarily fixed.

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