The WASM Cloak: Evaluating Browser Fingerprinting Defenses Under WebAssembly based Obfuscation

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2508.21219v1
• Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2025 21:21:51 GMT
• Title: The WASM Cloak: Evaluating Browser Fingerprinting Defenses Under WebAssembly based Obfuscation
• Abstract summary: Browser fingerprinting defenses have historically focused on detecting JavaScript(JS)-based tracking techniques.<n>WebAssembly (WASM) introduces a potential blind spot, as adversaries can convert JS to WASM's low-level binary format to obfuscate malicious logic.<n>This paper presents the first systematic evaluation of how such WASM-based obfuscation impacts the robustness of modern fingerprinting defenses.
• Score: 3.3544069030990538
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
• Abstract: Browser fingerprinting defenses have historically focused on detecting JavaScript(JS)-based tracking techniques. However, the widespread adoption of WebAssembly (WASM) introduces a potential blind spot, as adversaries can convert JS to WASM's low-level binary format to obfuscate malicious logic. This paper presents the first systematic evaluation of how such WASM-based obfuscation impacts the robustness of modern fingerprinting defenses. We develop an automated pipeline that translates real-world JS fingerprinting scripts into functional WASM-obfuscated variants and test them against two classes of defenses: state-of-the-art detectors in research literature and commercial, in-browser tools. Our findings reveal a notable divergence: detectors proposed in the research literature that rely on feature-based analysis of source code show moderate vulnerability, stemming from outdated datasets or a lack of WASM compatibility. In contrast, defenses such as browser extensions and native browser features remained completely effective, as their API-level interception is agnostic to the script's underlying implementation. These results highlight a gap between academic and practical defense strategies and offer insights into strengthening detection approaches against WASM-based obfuscation, while also revealing opportunities for more evasive techniques in future attacks.

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