Unaligned Incentives: Pricing Attacks Against Blockchain Rollups

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2509.17126v1
• Date: Sun, 21 Sep 2025 15:39:08 GMT
• Title: Unaligned Incentives: Pricing Attacks Against Blockchain Rollups
• Authors: Stefanos Chaliasos, Conner Swann, Sina Pilehchiha, Nicolas Mohnblatt, Benjamin Livshits, Assimakis Kattis,
• Abstract summary: We identify critical mis-pricings in existing rollup transaction fee mechanisms that allow for two powerful attacks.<n>An adversary can saturate the L2's DA batch capacity with compute-light data-heavy transactions, forcing low-gas batches that enable both L2 DoS attacks, and finality-delay attacks.<n>We propose comprehensive mitigations to prevent these attacks and suggest how some practical uses of multi-dimensional rollupMs can rectify the identified mis-pricing attacks.
• Score: 5.416444421133014
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Rollups have become the de facto scalability solution for Ethereum, securing more than $55B in assets. They achieve scale by executing transactions on a Layer 2 ledger, while periodically posting data and finalizing state on the Layer 1, either optimistically or via validity proofs. Their fees must simultaneously reflect the pricing of three resources: L2 costs (e.g., execution), L1 DA, and underlying L1 gas costs for batch settlement and proof verification. In this work, we identify critical mis-pricings in existing rollup transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) that allow for two powerful attacks. Firstly, an adversary can saturate the L2's DA batch capacity with compute-light data-heavy transactions, forcing low-gas transaction batches that enable both L2 DoS attacks, and finality-delay attacks. Secondly, by crafting prover killer transactions that maximize proving cycles relative to the gas charges, an adversary can effectively stall proof generation, delaying finality by hours and inflicting prover-side economic losses to the rollup at a minimal cost. We analyze the above attack vectors across the major Ethereum rollups, quantifying adversarial costs and protocol losses. We find that the first attack enables periodic DoS on rollups, lasting up to 30 minutes, at a cost below 2 ETH for most rollups. Moreover, we identify three rollups that are exposed to indefinite DoS at a cost of approximately 0.8 to 2.7 ETH per hour. The attack can be further modified to increase finalization delays by a factor of about 1.45x to 2.73x, compared to direct L1 blob-stuffing, depending on the rollup's parameters. Furthermore, we find that the prover killer attack induces a finalization latency increase of about 94x. Finally, we propose comprehensive mitigations to prevent these attacks and suggest how some practical uses of multi-dimensional rollup TFMs can rectify the identified mis-pricing attacks.

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