Bidirectional Intention Inference Enhances LLMs' Defense Against Multi-Turn Jailbreak Attacks

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2509.22732v1
• Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2025 13:29:48 GMT
• Title: Bidirectional Intention Inference Enhances LLMs' Defense Against Multi-Turn Jailbreak Attacks
• Abstract summary: "jailbreak" attacks exploit adversarial prompts to bypass safety alignment mechanisms.<n>We propose the Bi Intention Inference Defense (BIID) to address this challenge.<n>BIID integrates forward request-based intention inference with backward response-based intention retrospection.
• Score: 18.3415330691504
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
• Abstract: The remarkable capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have raised significant safety concerns, particularly regarding "jailbreak" attacks that exploit adversarial prompts to bypass safety alignment mechanisms. Existing defense research primarily focuses on single-turn attacks, whereas multi-turn jailbreak attacks progressively break through safeguards through by concealing malicious intent and tactical manipulation, ultimately rendering conventional single-turn defenses ineffective. To address this critical challenge, we propose the Bidirectional Intention Inference Defense (BIID). The method integrates forward request-based intention inference with backward response-based intention retrospection, establishing a bidirectional synergy mechanism to detect risks concealed within seemingly benign inputs, thereby constructing a more robust guardrails that effectively prevents harmful content generation. The proposed method undergoes systematic evaluation compared with a no-defense baseline and seven representative defense methods across three LLMs and two safety benchmarks under 10 different attack methods. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method significantly reduces the Attack Success Rate (ASR) across both single-turn and multi-turn jailbreak attempts, outperforming all existing baseline methods while effectively maintaining practical utility. Notably, comparative experiments across three multi-turn safety datasets further validate the proposed model's significant advantages over other defense approaches.

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