Signing Right Away
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2510.09656v1
- Date: Tue, 07 Oct 2025 11:56:56 GMT
- Title: Signing Right Away
- Abstract summary: Signing Right Away (SRA) is a comprehensive security architecture that guarantees the provenance of digital media.<n>SRA ensures that every captured image and video carries an immutable, verifiable proof of origin.
- Score: 0.0
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
- Abstract: The proliferation of high-fidelity synthetic media, coupled with exploitable hardware vulnerabilities in conventional imaging pipelines, has precipitated a crisis of trust in digital content. Existing countermeasures, from post-hoc classifiers to software-based signing, fail to address the fundamental challenge of establishing an unbreakable link to reality at the moment of capture. This whitepaper introduces Signing Right Away (SRA), a comprehensive security architecture that guarantees the provenance of digital media from "silicon to silicon to signed file." SRA leverages a four-pillar security model-Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication, and Replay Protection, akin to the MIPI Camera Security Framework (CSF), but also extends its scope beyond the internal data bus to the creation of a cryptographically sealed, C2PA-compliant final asset. By securing the entire imaging pipeline within a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), SRA ensures that every captured image and video carries an immutable, verifiable proof of origin. This provides a foundational solution for industries reliant on trustworthy visual information, including journalism, legal evidence, and insurance. We present the SRA architecture, a detailed implementation roadmap informed by empirical prototyping, and a comparative analysis that positions SRA as the essential "last mile" in the chain of content trust.
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