T2I-RiskyPrompt: A Benchmark for Safety Evaluation, Attack, and Defense on Text-to-Image Model

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2510.22300v1
• Date: Sat, 25 Oct 2025 14:00:26 GMT
• Title: T2I-RiskyPrompt: A Benchmark for Safety Evaluation, Attack, and Defense on Text-to-Image Model
• Authors: Chenyu Zhang, Tairen Zhang, Lanjun Wang, Ruidong Chen, Wenhui Li, Anan Liu,
• Abstract summary: We introduce T2I-RiskyPrompt, a benchmark for evaluating safety-related tasks in T2I models.<n>We first develop a hierarchical risk taxonomy, which consists of 6 primary categories and 14 fine-grained subcategories.<n>We construct a pipeline to collect and annotate risky prompts, where each prompt is annotated with both hierarchical category labels and detailed risk reasons.<n>Based on T2I-RiskyPrompt, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of eight T2I models, nine defense methods, five safety filters, and five attack strategies.
• Score: 41.31194907935869
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Using risky text prompts, such as pornography and violent prompts, to test the safety of text-to-image (T2I) models is a critical task. However, existing risky prompt datasets are limited in three key areas: 1) limited risky categories, 2) coarse-grained annotation, and 3) low effectiveness. To address these limitations, we introduce T2I-RiskyPrompt, a comprehensive benchmark designed for evaluating safety-related tasks in T2I models. Specifically, we first develop a hierarchical risk taxonomy, which consists of 6 primary categories and 14 fine-grained subcategories. Building upon this taxonomy, we construct a pipeline to collect and annotate risky prompts. Finally, we obtain 6,432 effective risky prompts, where each prompt is annotated with both hierarchical category labels and detailed risk reasons. Moreover, to facilitate the evaluation, we propose a reason-driven risky image detection method that explicitly aligns the MLLM with safety annotations. Based on T2I-RiskyPrompt, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of eight T2I models, nine defense methods, five safety filters, and five attack strategies, offering nine key insights into the strengths and limitations of T2I model safety. Finally, we discuss potential applications of T2I-RiskyPrompt across various research fields. The dataset and code are provided in https://github.com/datar001/T2I-RiskyPrompt.

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