EASE: Practical and Efficient Safety Alignment for Small Language Models

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2511.06512v1
• Date: Sun, 09 Nov 2025 19:46:54 GMT
• Title: EASE: Practical and Efficient Safety Alignment for Small Language Models
• Authors: Haonan Shi, Guoli Wang, Tu Ouyang, An Wang,
• Abstract summary: Small language models (SLMs) are increasingly deployed on edge devices, making their safety alignment crucial yet challenging.<n>We propose EASE, a novel framework that enables practical and Efficient safety alignment for Small languagE models.
• Score: 4.839980912290382
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Small language models (SLMs) are increasingly deployed on edge devices, making their safety alignment crucial yet challenging. Current shallow alignment methods that rely on direct refusal of malicious queries fail to provide robust protection, particularly against adversarial jailbreaks. While deliberative safety reasoning alignment offers deeper alignment for defending against sophisticated attacks, effectively implanting such reasoning capability in SLMs with limited capabilities remains an open challenge. Moreover, safety reasoning incurs significant computational overhead as models apply reasoning to nearly all queries, making it impractical for resource-constrained edge deployment scenarios that demand rapid responses. We propose EASE, a novel framework that enables practical and Efficient safety Alignment for Small languagE models. Our approach first identifies the optimal safety reasoning teacher that can effectively distill safety reasoning capabilities to SLMs. We then align models to selectively activate safety reasoning for dangerous adversarial jailbreak queries while providing direct responses to straightforward malicious queries and general helpful tasks. This selective mechanism enables small models to maintain robust safety guarantees against sophisticated attacks while preserving computational efficiency for benign interactions. Experimental results demonstrate that EASE reduces jailbreak attack success rates by up to 17% compared to shallow alignment methods while reducing inference overhead by up to 90% compared to deliberative safety reasoning alignment, making it practical for SLMs real-world edge deployments.

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