Proving DNSSEC Correctness: A Formal Approach to Secure Domain Name Resolution
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2512.11431v1
- Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2025 10:12:06 GMT
- Title: Proving DNSSEC Correctness: A Formal Approach to Secure Domain Name Resolution
- Authors: Qifan Zhang, Zilin Shen, Imtiaz Karim, Elisa Bertino, Zhou Li,
- Abstract summary: This paper introduces DNSSECVerif, the first framework for comprehensive, automated formal security analysis of the DNSSEC protocol suite.<n>We formally prove four of DNSSEC's core security guarantees and uncover critical ambiguities in the standards.<n>Our work provides crucial, evidence-based recommendations for hardening DNSSEC specifications and implementations.
- Score: 12.033681333491685
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
- Abstract: The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) are critical for preventing DNS spoofing, yet its specifications contain ambiguities and vulnerabilities that elude traditional "break-and-fix" approaches. A holistic, foundational security analysis of the protocol has thus remained an open problem. This paper introduces DNSSECVerif, the first framework for comprehensive, automated formal security analysis of the DNSSEC protocol suite. Built on the SAPIC+ symbolic verifier, our high-fidelity model captures protocol-level interactions, including cryptographic operations and stateful caching with fine-grained concurrency control. Using DNSSECVerif, we formally prove four of DNSSEC's core security guarantees and uncover critical ambiguities in the standards--notably, the insecure coexistence of NSEC and NSEC3. Our model also automatically rediscovers three classes of known attacks, demonstrating fundamental weaknesses in the protocol design. To bridge the model-to-reality gap, we validate our findings through targeted testing of mainstream DNS software and a large-scale measurement study of over 2.2 million open resolvers, confirming the real-world impact of these flaws. Our work provides crucial, evidence-based recommendations for hardening DNSSEC specifications and implementations.
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