Application-Specific Power Side-Channel Attacks and Countermeasures: A Survey

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2512.23785v1
• Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2025 17:13:16 GMT
• Title: Application-Specific Power Side-Channel Attacks and Countermeasures: A Survey
• Authors: Sahan Sanjaya, Aruna Jayasena, Prabhat Mishra,
• Abstract summary: Side-channel attacks try to extract secret information from a system by analyzing different side-channel signatures, such as power consumption, electromagnetic emanation, thermal dissipation, acoustics, time, etc.<n>Power-based side-channel attack is one of the most prominent side-channel attacks in cybersecurity, which rely on data-dependent power variations in a system to extract sensitive information.
• Score: 4.92575823723555
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Side-channel attacks try to extract secret information from a system by analyzing different side-channel signatures, such as power consumption, electromagnetic emanation, thermal dissipation, acoustics, time, etc. Power-based side-channel attack is one of the most prominent side-channel attacks in cybersecurity, which rely on data-dependent power variations in a system to extract sensitive information. While there are related surveys, they primarily focus on power side-channel attacks on cryptographic implementations. In recent years, power-side channel attacks have been explored in diverse application domains, including key extraction from cryptographic implementations, reverse engineering of machine learning models, user behavior data exploitation, and instruction-level disassembly. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey of power side-channel attacks and their countermeasures in different application domains. Specifically, this survey aims to classify recent power side-channel attacks and provide a comprehensive comparison based on application-specific considerations.

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