Unpacking Security Scanners for GitHub Actions Workflows

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2601.14455v1
• Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2026 20:25:11 GMT
• Title: Unpacking Security Scanners for GitHub Actions Workflows
• Authors: Madjda Fares, Yogya Gamage, Benoit Baudry,
• Abstract summary: GitHub Actions is a widely used platform that allows developers to automate the build and deployment of their projects.<n>As the platform's popularity continues to grow, it has become a target of choice for recent software supply chain attacks.<n>Several security scanners have emerged to help developers harden their GitHub Actions.
• Score: 2.046588369793562
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: GitHub Actions is a widely used platform that allows developers to automate the build and deployment of their projects through configurable workflows. As the platform's popularity continues to grow, it has become a target of choice for recent software supply chain attacks. These attacks exploit excessive permissions, ambiguous versions, or the absence of artifact integrity checks to compromise workflows. In response to these attacks, several security scanners have emerged to help developers harden their workflows. In this paper, we perform the first systematic comparison of 9 GitHub Actions workflow security scanners. We compare them in terms of scope (which security weaknesses they target), detection capabilities (how many weaknesses they detect), and usability (how long they take to scan a workflow). To compare scanners on a common ground, we first establish a taxonomy of 10 security weaknesses that can occur in GitHub Actions workflows. Then, we run the scanners against a curated set of 596 workflows. Our study reveals that the landscape of GitHub Actions workflow security scanners is diverse, with both broad-scope tools and very focused ones. More importantly, we show that scanners interpret security weaknesses differently, leading to significant differences in the type and number of reported weaknesses. Based on this empirical evidence, we make actionable recommendations for developers to harden their GitHub Actions workflows.

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