Beyond Denial-of-Service: The Puppeteer's Attack for Fine-Grained Control in Ranking-Based Federated Learning
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2601.14687v1
- Date: Wed, 21 Jan 2026 06:03:11 GMT
- Title: Beyond Denial-of-Service: The Puppeteer's Attack for Fine-Grained Control in Ranking-Based Federated Learning
- Authors: Zhihao Chen, Zirui Gong, Jianting Ning, Yanjun Zhang, Leo Yu Zhang,
- Abstract summary: We introduce the Edge Control Attack (ECA), the first fine-grained control attack tailored to ranking-based FL frameworks.<n>ECA achieves fine-grained accuracy control with an average error of only 0.224%, outperforming the baseline by up to 17x.<n>Our findings highlight the need for stronger defenses against advanced poisoning attacks.
- Score: 37.22418291316679
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: Federated Rank Learning (FRL) is a promising Federated Learning (FL) paradigm designed to be resilient against model poisoning attacks due to its discrete, ranking-based update mechanism. Unlike traditional FL methods that rely on model updates, FRL leverages discrete rankings as a communication parameter between clients and the server. This approach significantly reduces communication costs and limits an adversary's ability to scale or optimize malicious updates in the continuous space, thereby enhancing its robustness. This makes FRL particularly appealing for applications where system security and data privacy are crucial, such as web-based auction and bidding platforms. While FRL substantially reduces the attack surface, we demonstrate that it remains vulnerable to a new class of local model poisoning attack, i.e., fine-grained control attacks. We introduce the Edge Control Attack (ECA), the first fine-grained control attack tailored to ranking-based FL frameworks. Unlike conventional denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that cause conspicuous disruptions, ECA enables an adversary to precisely degrade a competitor's accuracy to any target level while maintaining a normal-looking convergence trajectory, thereby avoiding detection. ECA operates in two stages: (i) identifying and manipulating Ascending and Descending Edges to align the global model with the target model, and (ii) widening the selection boundary gap to stabilize the global model at the target accuracy. Extensive experiments across seven benchmark datasets and nine Byzantine-robust aggregation rules (AGRs) show that ECA achieves fine-grained accuracy control with an average error of only 0.224%, outperforming the baseline by up to 17x. Our findings highlight the need for stronger defenses against advanced poisoning attacks. Our code is available at: https://github.com/Chenzh0205/ECA
Related papers
- FAROS: Robust Federated Learning with Adaptive Scaling against Backdoor Attacks [9.466036066320946]
backdoor attacks pose a significant threat to Federated Learning (FL)<n>We propose FAROS, an enhanced FL framework that incorporates Adaptive Differential Scaling (ADS) and Robust Core-set Computing (RCC)<n>RCC effectively mitigates the risk of single-point failure by computing the centroid of a core set comprising clients with the highest confidence.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-01-05T06:55:35Z) - FLAegis: A Two-Layer Defense Framework for Federated Learning Against Poisoning Attacks [2.6599014990168843]
Federated Learning (FL) has become a powerful technique for training Machine Learning (ML) models in a decentralized manner.<n>Third parties, known as Byzantine clients, can poison the training process by submitting false model updates.<n>This study introduces FLAegis, a two-stage defensive framework designed to identify Byzantine clients and improve the robustness of FL systems.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2025-08-26T07:09:15Z) - Not All Edges are Equally Robust: Evaluating the Robustness of Ranking-Based Federated Learning [49.68790647579509]
Federated Ranking Learning (FRL) is a state-of-the-art FL framework that stands out for its communication efficiency and resilience to poisoning attacks.<n>We introduce a novel local model poisoning attack against FRL, namely the Vulnerable Edge Manipulation (VEM) attack.<n>Our attack achieves an overall 53.23% attack impact and is 3.7x more impactful than existing methods.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2025-03-12T00:38:14Z) - Celtibero: Robust Layered Aggregation for Federated Learning [0.0]
We introduce Celtibero, a novel defense mechanism that integrates layered aggregation to enhance robustness against adversarial manipulation.
We demonstrate that Celtibero consistently achieves high main task accuracy (MTA) while maintaining minimal attack success rates (ASR) across a range of untargeted and targeted poisoning attacks.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2024-08-26T12:54:00Z) - Learn from the Past: A Proxy Guided Adversarial Defense Framework with
Self Distillation Regularization [53.04697800214848]
Adversarial Training (AT) is pivotal in fortifying the robustness of deep learning models.
AT methods, relying on direct iterative updates for target model's defense, frequently encounter obstacles such as unstable training and catastrophic overfitting.
We present a general proxy guided defense framework, LAST' (bf Learn from the Pbf ast)
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2023-10-19T13:13:41Z) - Client-side Gradient Inversion Against Federated Learning from Poisoning [59.74484221875662]
Federated Learning (FL) enables distributed participants to train a global model without sharing data directly to a central server.
Recent studies have revealed that FL is vulnerable to gradient inversion attack (GIA), which aims to reconstruct the original training samples.
We propose Client-side poisoning Gradient Inversion (CGI), which is a novel attack method that can be launched from clients.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2023-09-14T03:48:27Z) - G$^2$uardFL: Safeguarding Federated Learning Against Backdoor Attacks
through Attributed Client Graph Clustering [116.4277292854053]
Federated Learning (FL) offers collaborative model training without data sharing.
FL is vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where poisoned model weights lead to compromised system integrity.
We present G$2$uardFL, a protective framework that reinterprets the identification of malicious clients as an attributed graph clustering problem.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2023-06-08T07:15:04Z) - Avoid Adversarial Adaption in Federated Learning by Multi-Metric
Investigations [55.2480439325792]
Federated Learning (FL) facilitates decentralized machine learning model training, preserving data privacy, lowering communication costs, and boosting model performance through diversified data sources.
FL faces vulnerabilities such as poisoning attacks, undermining model integrity with both untargeted performance degradation and targeted backdoor attacks.
We define a new notion of strong adaptive adversaries, capable of adapting to multiple objectives simultaneously.
MESAS is the first defense robust against strong adaptive adversaries, effective in real-world data scenarios, with an average overhead of just 24.37 seconds.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2023-06-06T11:44:42Z) - FLIP: A Provable Defense Framework for Backdoor Mitigation in Federated
Learning [66.56240101249803]
We study how hardening benign clients can affect the global model (and the malicious clients)
We propose a trigger reverse engineering based defense and show that our method can achieve improvement with guarantee robustness.
Our results on eight competing SOTA defense methods show the empirical superiority of our method on both single-shot and continuous FL backdoor attacks.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2022-10-23T22:24:03Z) - FL-WBC: Enhancing Robustness against Model Poisoning Attacks in
Federated Learning from a Client Perspective [35.10520095377653]
Federated learning (FL) is a popular distributed learning framework that trains a global model through iterative communications between a central server and edge devices.
Recent works have demonstrated that FL is vulnerable to model poisoning attacks.
We propose a client-based defense, named White Blood Cell for Federated Learning (FL-WBC), which can mitigate model poisoning attacks.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2021-10-26T17:13:35Z)
This list is automatically generated from the titles and abstracts of the papers in this site.
This site does not guarantee the quality of this site (including all information) and is not responsible for any consequences.