Post-selection games

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2601.18861v1
• Date: Mon, 26 Jan 2026 19:00:00 GMT
• Title: Post-selection games
• Authors: Víctor Calleja Rodríguez, Ivan A. Bocanegra-Garay, Mateus Araújo,
• Abstract summary: We introduce post-selection games, a generalization of nonlocal games where each round can be won or lost by the players, but also discarded by the referee.<n>We develop algorithms for computing the local and unbounded Tsirelson bounds of post-selection games.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: In this paper, we introduce post-selection games, a generalization of nonlocal games where each round can be not only won or lost by the players, but also discarded by the referee. Such games naturally formalize possibilistic proofs of nonlocality, such as Hardy's paradox. We develop algorithms for computing the local and Tsirelson bounds of post-selection games. Furthermore, we show that they have an unbounded advantage in statistical power over traditional nonlocal games, making them ideally suited for analysing Bell tests with low detection efficiency.

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