Chain-of-Authorization: Internalizing Authorization into Large Language Models via Reasoning Trajectories

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2603.22869v1
• Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2026 07:13:01 GMT
• Title: Chain-of-Authorization: Internalizing Authorization into Large Language Models via Reasoning Trajectories
• Abstract summary: Chain-of-Authorization (CoA) framework internalizes authorization logic into Large Language Models' core capabilities.<n>CoA integrates policy execution with task responses, making authorization a causal prerequisite for substantive responses.
• Score: 21.063230721511726
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) have become core cognitive components in modern artificial intelligence (AI) systems, combining internal knowledge with external context to perform complex tasks. However, LLMs typically treat all accessible data indiscriminately, lacking inherent awareness of knowledge ownership and access boundaries. This deficiency heightens risks of sensitive data leakage and adversarial manipulation, potentially enabling unauthorized system access and severe security crises. Existing protection strategies rely on rigid, uniform defense that prevent dynamic authorization. Structural isolation methods faces scalability bottlenecks, while prompt guidance methods struggle with fine-grained permissions distinctions. Here, we propose the Chain-of-Authorization (CoA) framework, a secure training and reasoning paradigm that internalizes authorization logic into LLMs' core capabilities. Unlike passive external defneses, CoA restructures the model's information flow: it embeds permission context at input and requires generating explicit authorization reasoning trajectory that includes resource review, identity resolution, and decision-making stages before final response. Through supervised fine-tuning on data covering various authorization status, CoA integrates policy execution with task responses, making authorization a causal prerequisite for substantive responses. Extensive evaluations show that CoA not only maintains comparable utility in authorized scenarios but also overcomes the cognitive confusion when permissions mismatches. It exhibits high rejection rates against various unauthorized and adversarial access. This mechanism leverages LLMs' reasoning capability to perform dynamic authorization, using natural language understanding as a proactive security mechanism for deploying reliable LLMs in modern AI systems.

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