What a Mesh: Formal Security Analysis of WPA3 SAE Wireless Authentication
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2603.23352v1
- Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2026 15:54:05 GMT
- Title: What a Mesh: Formal Security Analysis of WPA3 SAE Wireless Authentication
- Abstract summary: IEEE 802.11 includes a secure authentication protocol called SAE, whose use is mandatory for WPA3-Personal networks.<n> protocol is specified at two separate but linked levels: a traditional cryptographic description of the communication logic between network devices, and a state machine description that realises the former in each single device.<n>We present detailed formal models of the protocol at both levels, provide precise specifications of its security properties, and analyse machine-checked proofs in ProVerif andTA.
- Score: 1.1536806813645057
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: The latest Wi-Fi security standard, IEEE 802.11, includes a secure authentication protocol called SAE, whose use is mandatory for WPA3-Personal networks. The protocol is specified at two separate but linked levels: a traditional cryptographic description of the communication logic between network devices, and a state machine description that realises the former in each single device. Current formal verification efforts focus mainly on communication logic. We present detailed formal models of the protocol at both levels, provide precise specifications of its security properties, and analyse machine-checked proofs in ProVerif and ASMETA. The integrated analysis of the above two models is particularly novel, enabling us to identify and address several issues in the current IEEE 802.11 specification more thoroughly than would have been possible otherwise, leading to several official revisions of the standard.
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