Inertial Mining: Equilibrium Implementation of the Bitcoin Protocol

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2604.06092v1
• Date: Tue, 07 Apr 2026 17:06:02 GMT
• Title: Inertial Mining: Equilibrium Implementation of the Bitcoin Protocol
• Abstract summary: The value of proof-of-work cryptocurrencies depends on miners having incentives to follow the protocol.<n>We propose inertial mining, a novel mining protocol.
• Score: 1.1470070927586018
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: The value of proof-of-work cryptocurrencies critically depends on miners having incentives to follow the protocol. However, the Bitcoin mining protocol proposed by Nakamoto (2008) and implemented in practice is well known not to constitute an equilibrium: Eyal and Sirer (2018) construct a profitable deviation called ``selfish mining'' which relies on strategically delaying disclosure of newly mined blocks rather than publishing them immediately. We propose inertial mining, a novel mining protocol. When miners follow inertial mining, they produce the outcome intended by Nakamoto, i.e., a single longest chain. But unlike the Bitcoin mining protocol, inertial mining constitutes an equilibrium (assuming no miner controls more than half of the mining power). Indeed, neither selfish mining nor any other deviation is profitable. Furthermore, inertial mining only changes miners' behavior in the event of off-path forks, and can be implemented in Bitcoin without any changes to its consensus mechanism or blockchain architecture.

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