CASCADE: A Cascaded Hybrid Defense Architecture for Prompt Injection Detection in MCP-Based Systems
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2604.17125v1
- Date: Sat, 18 Apr 2026 19:53:09 GMT
- Title: CASCADE: A Cascaded Hybrid Defense Architecture for Prompt Injection Detection in MCP-Based Systems
- Abstract summary: Existing defense systems suffer from limitations including high false positive rates, API dependency, or white-box access requirements.<n>We propose CASCADE, a three-tiered cascaded defense architecture for MCP-based systems.<n>A key advantage of CASCADE over existing solutions is its fully local operation, requiring no external API calls.
- Score: 0.0
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Abstract: Model Context Protocol (MCP) is a rapidly adopted standard for defining and invoking external tools in LLM applications. The multi-layered architecture of MCP introduces new attack surfaces such as tool poisoning, in addition to traditional prompt injection. Existing defense systems suffer from limitations including high false positive rates, API dependency, or white-box access requirements. In this study, we propose CASCADE, a three-tiered cascaded defense architecture for MCP-based systems: (i) Layer 1 performs fast pre-filtering using regex, phrase weighting, and entropy analysis; (ii) Layer 2 conducts semantic analysis via BGE embedding with an Ollama Llama3 fallback mechanism; (iii) Layer 3 applies pattern-based output filtering. Evaluation on a dataset of 5,000 samples yielded 95.85% precision, 6.06% false positive rate, 61.05% recall, and 74.59% F1-score. Analysis across 31 attack types categorized into 6 tiers revealed high detection rates for data exfiltration (91.5%) and prompt injection (84.2%), while semantic attack (52.5%) and tool poisoning (59.9%) categories showed potential for improvement. A key advantage of CASCADE over existing solutions is its fully local operation, requiring no external API calls
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