Insecure Despite Proven Updated: Extracting the Root VCEK Seed on EPYC Milan via a Software-Only Attack

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2605.12990v1
• Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 04:40:23 GMT
• Title: Insecure Despite Proven Updated: Extracting the Root VCEK Seed on EPYC Milan via a Software-Only Attack
• Abstract summary: AMD emphasizes the capability to prevent Trusted Computing Base rollback attacks.<n>In this architecture, safeguarding the hardware root seed is the ultimate line of defense.<n>We introduce MilanLaunchy attack, an exploit that achieves code execution on the AMD secure processor.<n>We develop BadFuse attack, which extracts the hardware root seed by exploiting a lack of write restrictions in the fuse controller.
• Score: 4.709588811674974
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: In the official whitepaper of Secure Encrypted Virtualization with Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP), AMD explicitly emphasizes the capability to prevent Trusted Computing Base (TCB) rollback attacks. Cryptographically, this is realized by signing attestation reports with the Versioned Chip Endorsement Key (VCEK), which is derived by incorporating the TCB version into the hardware root seed. In this architecture, safeguarding the hardware root seed is the ultimate line of defense. However, our research reveals that this protection is insufficient on EPYC Milan by presenting a software-only exploit. Specifically, we firstly introduce MilanLaunchy attack, an exploit that achieves code execution on the AMD secure processor. Building on this foundation, we develop the BadFuse attack, which extracts the hardware root seed by exploiting a lack of write restrictions in the fuse controller. This end-to-end attack chain enables an adversary to forge valid attestation reports for any firmware version, thereby effectively undermining the security model of SEV-SNP.

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