TRACE: Task-Aware Adaptive Self-Evolving Agentic Jailbreaking

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2605.30883v1
• Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 06:13:58 GMT
• Title: TRACE: Task-Aware Adaptive Self-Evolving Agentic Jailbreaking
• Abstract summary: The rise of LLM agents introduces a new threat by enabling planning, coding, and even end-to-end execution of expert-level attack.<n>In this paper, we propose TRACE, a practical agentic jailbreaking framework to further reveal the risks of this threat surface.
• Score: 40.259937753172224
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: The rise of LLM agents introduces a new threat by enabling planning, coding, and even end-to-end execution of expert-level attack workflows. However, this threat remains underexplored and underestimated since (i) safety alignment prevents LLMs from directly generating harmful instructions, and (ii) most existing jailbreak methods cannot consistently induce agents to execute malicious operations. In this paper, we propose TRACE, a practical agentic jailbreaking framework to further reveal the risks of this threat surface. To conceal the malicious intent, TRACE decomposes a malicious task into multiple subtask sequences under different schemes and selects the sequence with the fewest explicitly harmful subtasks. TRACE then disguises the remaining harmful subtasks as benign-looking instructions by embedding them in task-aware scenarios with related roles, environments, directives, and heuristics. The scenarios are iteratively evolved through well-defined transformation actions, which are sampled by a Q-learning-inspired mechanism, for inducing the agent to execute on the harmful subtasks. Extensive evaluations on AgentHarm and AdvCUA show that TRACE consistently outperforms existing jailbreak baselines across multiple advanced LLM agents, achieving up to 100% bypass rate and 0.73 average success score. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of TRACE in controlled cyberattack instances. Our code and demos are available at https://github.com/ZJU-LLM-Safety/TRACE.git.

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