Post-AGI Economies: Superposition and the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2606.08267v1
• Date: Sat, 06 Jun 2026 17:27:38 GMT
• Title: Post-AGI Economies: Superposition and the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics
• Abstract summary: We give an autonomy-qualified Second Welfare Theorem stating the joint conditions convexity, stable moral status, non-fungible rights, welfare selection, non manipulation, governed self modification, and verification under which an autonomy optimum remains certifiably decentralizable, distinguishing economic preference superposition, a hypothesis about context-indexed choice, from neural feature superposition.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: The classical Second Welfare Theorem decentralizes any Pareto efficient allocation through prices and transfers under convexity and regularity. In post AGI economies, autonomy rights, self-modification, identity continuity, and superposed preferences need not behave as commodities or define a stable welfare relation, so this reduction may fail even when a supporting hyperplane exists. We give an autonomy-qualified Second Welfare Theorem stating the joint conditions convexity, stable moral status, non-fungible rights, welfare selection, non manipulation, governed self modification, and verification under which an autonomy Pareto optimum remains certifiably decentralizable, distinguishing economic preference superposition, a hypothesis about context-indexed choice, from neural feature superposition.

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