Agentra: A Supervisable Multi-Agent Framework for Enterprise Intrusion Response
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2606.18325v2
- Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 13:19:05 GMT
- Title: Agentra: A Supervisable Multi-Agent Framework for Enterprise Intrusion Response
- Abstract summary: Agentra is a supervisable multi-agent Intrusion Response System (IRS)<n>IRS framework converts alerts from IDS, XDR platforms into structured incident response plans grounded in MITRE ATT&CK, MITRE D3FEND, and NIST CSF 2.0.
- Score: 7.050203329515689
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
- Abstract: Enterprise intrusion response still depends on static playbooks and analyst-driven triage, creating delay between alert generation and containment. We present Agentra, a supervisable multi-agent Intrusion Response System (IRS) framework that converts alerts from IDS, EDR, and XDR platforms into structured incident response plans grounded in MITRE ATT&CK, MITRE D3FEND, and NIST CSF 2.0. Agentra decomposes response reasoning across role-scoped agents, validates proposed plans through a bounded Planner--Validator review loop, screens retrieved threat intelligence through a Moderator security gateway, gates actions through an Action Catalog and risk score, and records decisions in an append-only audit log. We evaluate Agentra against a static OASIS CACAO v2.0 cyber-playbook baseline on a 120-event corpus drawn from ThreatHunter-Playbook, Splunk BOTSv3, and DARPA OpTC. The strongest configuration improves FP-aware IRS F1 from 0.61 to 0.84 and restores the projected harmful-action rate to the static baseline level of 0.0% after Planner-only configurations introduce unsafe overreaction. These results indicate that multi-agent response planning can improve ontology-grounded IRS coverage while preserving analyst approval and auditability.
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