Exit-and-Join Dynamics for Decentralized Coalition Formation

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2606.19683v1
• Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 01:19:31 GMT
• Title: Exit-and-Join Dynamics for Decentralized Coalition Formation
• Abstract summary: We study coalition formation as a decentralized dynamical process driven by unilateral exit-and-join decisions.<n>Agents evaluate local moves using the Aumann-Dreze value, so payoffs are computed within the agent's current coalition.<n>A terminal partition is precisely a coalition structure with no admissible, individually profitable exit-and-join deviation.
• Score: 20.036142577511455
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
• Abstract: This paper studies coalition formation as a decentralized dynamical process driven by unilateral exit-and-join decisions. Agents evaluate local moves using the Aumann-Dreze value, so payoffs are computed within the agent's current coalition rather than through a globally negotiated coalition structure. The resulting model links cooperative payoff allocation with noncooperative best-response behavior: a terminal partition is precisely a coalition structure with no admissible, individually profitable exit-and-join deviation. We establish equilibrium characterizations, identify conditions under which the dynamics admit scalar Lyapunov or exact-potential representations, and analyze how switching and acceptance costs shape local stability. Numerical experiments test finite-time stabilization, cost sensitivity, and a special convex-game benchmark.

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