Bulkhead: Automated Semantic Detection and Remediation of Container Escape Vulnerabilities
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2607.12723v1
- Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 12:52:56 GMT
- Title: Bulkhead: Automated Semantic Detection and Remediation of Container Escape Vulnerabilities
- Abstract summary: Cross-boundary path misresolution weakens filesystem isolation in container ecosystems.<n>PaTra vulnerabilities stem from insecure host-container interactions.<n>We present Bulkhead, an automated framework that integrates large language models with formal methods for semantic vulnerability discovery and remediation.
- Score: 20.880313075865434
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: Filesystem isolation in container ecosystems is often weakened by cross-boundary path misresolution, causing path traversal (PaTra) vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities stem from insecure host-container interactions and have become increasingly pervasive as cloud systems mount shared resources, such as GPUs and agent workspaces, into containers to support AI workloads. Existing defenses remain inadequate. Kernel-level protections are intrusive, can destabilize system calls, and have therefore not been accepted into the Linux mainline. Detection methods rely on static rule matching or manual code auditing. Static rules can flag path-related functions but fail to capture the semantics needed to determine whether a host-container interaction exists, causing many false positives. Manual review requires domain expertise, making it costly, inefficient, and difficult to scale. To address this threat, we present Bulkhead, an automated framework that integrates large language models (LLMs) with formal methods for semantic vulnerability discovery and remediation. Bulkhead uses a multi-agent system to identify and repair PaTra vulnerabilities through multi-dimensional knowledge patterns generalized from known cases. It first applies high-risk functional patterns to locate entry points for cross-boundary interactions in containerized code, then uses call-chain patterns to recover the corresponding execution paths at suitable depth. The Detection pipeline analyzes these call chains against the application scenarios and threat model, identifying vulnerabilities such as missing security checks and TOCTOU flaws in cross-boundary interactions, and generating proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits for validation. These PoCs then guide patch generation. To ensure remediation correctness, the Patch pipeline performs assertion-driven verification using predefined model-checking templates.
Related papers
- AI Slop and Hallucinations in Vulnerability Assessment: A Survey on Reasoning Failures and Trustworthy Mitigation [48.55515767840701]
"AI slop" is artifacts, hallucinated vulnerabilities, plausible but incorrect patches, and semantically repackaged bug reports.<n>This paper surveys the empirical evidence, identifies a unifying mechanism, and traces a path toward trustworthy triage.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-08-26T11:48:38Z) - Adversarial Attacks in Multi-Agent LLM Pipelines: Unveiling Structural Vulnerabilities in Agentic AI Architectures [4.053243845971823]
Multi-agent LLM pipelines orchestrate specialized language model agents into structured where intermediate outputs are passed across agents to solve complex tasks.<n>This design introduces a security gap absent in single-agent settings: once an agent accepts adversarial content, it is propagated as trusted input throughout the pipeline.<n>We argue that this vulnerability stems from the absence of boundary verification, a security primitive that enforces explicit validation of data as it crosses inter-agent boundaries.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-08-01T15:35:58Z) - AutoTrace: From Patches to Triggers via Agentic Interprocedural Exploration [6.39392731596656]
Given a vulnerability-fixing commit, trigger localization asks which specific statement turns the vulnerable program state into a concrete unsafe operation.<n>We present AutoTrace, an agentic pipeline that localizes vulnerability triggers by exploring a code property graph layer by layer.<n>Agents never accept a trigger on their own authority; every reported trigger is backed by explicit evidence drawn from the graph.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-07-13T18:21:42Z) - Token-Flow Firewall: Semantic Runtime Auditing for Persistent AI Agents [76.4694046738862]
TokenWall is a runtime defense framework that acts as a semantic firewall over agent token flows.<n>We show that TokenWall reduces attack success rate to 12.5% while maintaining a 97.4% benign executable pass rate without human confirmation.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-07-09T12:18:40Z) - VIPER-MCP: Detecting and Exploiting Taint-Style Vulnerabilities in Model Context Protocol Servers [6.420136372317537]
VIPER-MCP is the first end-to-end automated vulnerability auditing framework for MCP servers.<n>It detects taint-style vulnerabilities and confirms their exploitability by producing concrete proof-of-concept prompts.<n>In a large-scale scan of 39,884 real-world open-source MCP server repositories, VIPER-MCP discovered 106 0-day vulnerabilities.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-05-20T16:46:51Z) - Attesting LLM Pipelines: Enforcing Verifiable Training and Release Claims [2.0403981727850233]
Modern Large Language Model (LLM) systems are assembled from third-party artifacts such as pre-trained weights, fine-tuning adapters, datasets, dependency packages, and container images.<n>This speed comes with supply-chain risks, including compromised dependencies, malicious hub artifacts, unsafe dedefaultization, forged provenance, and backdoored models.<n>We propose an attestation-aware promotion gate: before an artifact is admitted into trusted environments, the gate verifies claim evidence, enforces safe loading and static scanning policies, and applies secure-by-serial deployment constraints.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-03-30T20:37:48Z) - Dynamic analysis enhances issue resolution [53.50448142467294]
DAIRA (Dynamic Analysis-enhanced Issue Resolution Agent) is an automated repair framework that embeds dynamic analysis into the agent's reasoning cycle.<n> Driven by a Test Tracing-Driven methodology, DAIRA utilizes lightweight monitors to extract critical runtime data.<n>When powered by Gemini 3 Flash Preview, DAIRA establishes a new state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance, achieving a 79.4% resolution rate on the SWE-bench Verified dataset.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-03-23T14:48:54Z) - Beyond Input Guardrails: Reconstructing Cross-Agent Semantic Flows for Execution-Aware Attack Detection [32.301679396929536]
We propose SysName, a framework that shifts the defensive paradigm from static input filtering to execution-aware analysis.<n>SysName synthesizes fragmented operational primitives into contiguous behavioral trajectories, enabling a holistic view of system activity.<n> Empirical evaluations demonstrate that SysName effectively detects over ten distinct compound attack vectors, achieving F1-scores of 85.3% and 66.7% for node-level and path-level end-to-end attack detection, respectively.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-03-04T01:59:16Z) - Just Ask: Curious Code Agents Reveal System Prompts in Frontier LLMs [65.6660735371212]
We present textbftextscJustAsk, a framework that autonomously discovers effective extraction strategies through interaction alone.<n>It formulates extraction as an online exploration problem, using Upper Confidence Bound--based strategy selection and a hierarchical skill space spanning atomic probes and high-level orchestration.<n>Our results expose system prompts as a critical yet largely unprotected attack surface in modern agent systems.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2026-01-29T03:53:25Z) - The Trojan Knowledge: Bypassing Commercial LLM Guardrails via Harmless Prompt Weaving and Adaptive Tree Search [58.8834056209347]
Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass safety guardrails to elicit harmful outputs.<n>We introduce the Correlated Knowledge Attack Agent (CKA-Agent), a dynamic framework that reframes jailbreaking as an adaptive, tree-structured exploration of the target model's knowledge base.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2025-12-01T07:05:23Z) - BlindGuard: Safeguarding LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems under Unknown Attacks [58.959622170433725]
BlindGuard is an unsupervised defense method that learns without requiring any attack-specific labels or prior knowledge of malicious behaviors.<n>We show that BlindGuard effectively detects diverse attack types (i.e., prompt injection, memory poisoning, and tool attack) across multi-agent systems.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2025-08-11T16:04:47Z) - DRIFT: Dynamic Rule-Based Defense with Injection Isolation for Securing LLM Agents [52.92354372596197]
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly central to agentic systems due to their strong reasoning and planning capabilities.<n>This interaction also introduces the risk of prompt injection attacks, where malicious inputs from external sources can mislead the agent's behavior.<n>We propose a Dynamic Rule-based Isolation Framework for Trustworthy agentic systems, which enforces both control and data-level constraints.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2025-06-13T05:01:09Z)
This list is automatically generated from the titles and abstracts of the papers in this site.
This site does not guarantee the quality of this site (including all information) and is not responsible for any consequences.