An Automated Framework for Extracting Reachable Attack Chains from Cyber Threat Intelligence Reports

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2607.19742v1
• Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2026 04:16:35 GMT
• Title: An Automated Framework for Extracting Reachable Attack Chains from Cyber Threat Intelligence Reports
• Abstract summary: Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) reports richly describe real-world attack processes, but their unstructured narratives cannot be directly used for automated attack-path reasoning.<n>This paper proposes an automated framework that extracts reachable attack chains by modeling each attack step as an attack unit of preconditions, an attack behavior, and postconditions.
• Score: 8.445810236675674
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) reports richly describe real-world attack processes, but their unstructured narratives cannot be directly used for automated attack-path reasoning. Existing CTI extraction methods focus on indicators, entities, or TTP labels without modeling the execution conditions and resulting states of each attack step, so the extracted knowledge supports neither state matching nor reachability analysis across multi-stage attack chains. This paper proposes an automated framework that extracts reachable attack chains by modeling each attack step as an attack unit of preconditions, an attack behavior, and postconditions. A multi-stage pipeline assisted by large language models (LLMs) extracts attack behavior skeletons, recovers their preconditions and postconditions, normalizes them into predefined predicates, and repairs broken dependencies; the resulting units are compiled into Datalog-style rules for attack-goal reachability reasoning. On a dataset of 20 CTI reports containing 334 human-validated annotated steps, our framework achieves higher annotated-step coverage than representative CTI extraction systems in recovering attack behaviors. Moreover, by explicitly generating preconditions and postconditions, it produces attack units that are more complete and consistent than those generated by end-to-end LLM baselines. On the extracted chains, Datalog inference reaches the specified attack goal in 19 of 20 reports, while backward search yields 34 attack paths under the generated rules. The source code and experimental artifacts are available in an anonymized repository. .

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