Why Public Service AI Governance Frameworks Risk Failing in the Age of General-Purpose AI: Lessons from Policing

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2607.25648v1
• Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 12:34:04 GMT
• Title: Why Public Service AI Governance Frameworks Risk Failing in the Age of General-Purpose AI: Lessons from Policing
• Abstract summary: We argue that general-purpose AI (GPAI) models undermine the conditions under which AI safety has historically been pursued.<n>The safety concepts that public service governance frameworks foreground - accuracy, bias, explainability, and accountability - were made tractable by narrow, purpose-built AI.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Public services face growing pressure to adopt artificial intelligence (AI) to close the gap between rising demand and falling resources. That pressure has intensified with general-purpose AI (GPAI): AI built on large language models that can be directed by prompt alone to perform an effectively unbounded range of tasks. We argue that the properties that make these models attractive - their generality, accessibility, and low deployment cost - undermine the conditions under which AI safety has historically been pursued. The safety concepts that public service governance frameworks foreground - accuracy, bias, explainability, and accountability - were made tractable by narrow, purpose-built AI, and the mitigations that guidance documents prescribe presuppose exactly what GPAI removes. Accuracy cannot be quantified over unbounded outputs. Bias cannot be disaggregated when outputs are free-text judgements rather than categorical predictions. Explainability gives way to the appearance of explanation, and accountability erodes as outputs are optimized to persuade. We develop this through the case of policing, where the consequences of governance failure are most severe, and show why the same failure is likely to recur across other public services. The two mitigations that dominate policing AI strategy - expert evaluation and human-in-the-loop oversight - both rest on assumptions that GPAI violates. Safety assurance thus shifts from an intrinsic feature of building an AI tool to an optional add-on. We recommend a clear taxonomic distinction between narrow and general-purpose AI in governance documentation, a preference for technological parsimony, a pause on operational deployment of GPAI in policing until adequate evidence exists, and a coordinated national safety infrastructure with the authority to generate that evidence and determine when responsible deployment is achievable.

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