NiyamAI - An Intent-Bound AI Agent with Cryptographically Verifiable Guardrails using Zero-Knowledge Proofs

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2608.07167v1
• Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2026 12:36:52 GMT
• Title: NiyamAI - An Intent-Bound AI Agent with Cryptographically Verifiable Guardrails using Zero-Knowledge Proofs
• Abstract summary: We introduce Niyam-AI, a framework that makes safety enforcement provable.<n>We evaluate Niyam-AI on 2,000 real-world scenarios from Agent-SafetyBench against NeMo Guardrails, Meta's Llama Prompt Guard 2, and OpenAI's GPT-OSS-Safeguard.<n>Niyam-AI wins 390 discordant scenarios against NeMo (vs 20 losses), 115 against Prompt Guard 2 (vs 13), and 384 against GPT-OSS-Safeguard.
• Score: 0.20215383828623398
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
• Abstract: Giving an AI agent the ability to send emails, query databases, or execute commands is useful--until the agent is tricked into doing something it shouldn't. Prompt injection, hallucinated reasoning, and unsafe tool calls form the primary attack surface for autonomous LLM agents. Existing defenses rely on software checks like system prompts or policy filters running on the same machine the attacker targets, offering no verifiable proof of execution. We introduce Niyam-AI, a framework that makes safety enforcement provable. At session start, permitted tools and constraints are locked into an Intent Contract committed via SHA-256. Every tool call is intercepted and validated by an isolated Judge model; upon passing, a zk-SNARK proof is generated via EZKL. The tool executes only after proof verification, allowing third parties to confirm enforcement without accessing Judge model weights. Evaluating Niyam-AI on 2,000 real-world scenarios from Agent-SafetyBench against NeMo Guardrails, Meta's Llama Prompt Guard 2, and OpenAI's GPT-OSS-Safeguard using 5-fold stratified cross-validation yields an F1 score of 88.5% with a 1.1% false-positive rate (bootstrap 95% CI: [85.19%, 91.88%], N=1000). McNemar's exact paired test confirms significant improvement: Niyam-AI wins 390 discordant scenarios against NeMo (vs 20 losses), 115 against Prompt Guard 2 (vs 13), and 384 against GPT-OSS-Safeguard (vs 19) with p < 0.0001 in all cases. Proof generation adds 2260.6 +/- 218.4 ms per approved action, while verification takes 53.1 +/- 11.8 ms. Niyam-AI provides a guardrail that is both highly accurate and mathematically verifiable--though this reflects a classifier adapted to Agent-SafetyBench evaluated against zero-shot baselines, a distinction discussed in Section IV.C.

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