Breaking High Confidence: Practical Face Impersonation under High-Security Thresholds

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20884v1
• Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2026 09:02:22 GMT
• Title: Breaking High Confidence: Practical Face Impersonation under High-Security Thresholds
• Abstract summary: Face recognition systems (FRSs) are increasingly deployed in critical real-world services for authentication, such as banking applications and airport identity checks.<n>We propose the first successful impersonation attack against FRSs under high-security threshold settings.
• Score: 5.154142466077452
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Face recognition systems (FRSs) are increasingly deployed in critical real-world services for authentication, such as banking applications and airport identity checks, necessitating stringent security configurations. Consequently, the security vulnerabilities of FRSs have garnered significant attention. While existing studies have extensively explored FRS security, prior analyses have primarily focused on medium-security threshold settings, which are not directly applicable to FRSs operating under high-security constraints. In this paper, we propose the first successful impersonation attack against FRSs under high-security threshold settings. Among various threat models, we focus on a practical and challenging scenario: score-based impersonation attacks under strict rate limits. To precisely evaluate the feasibility of such attacks, we provide a principled mathematical analysis characterizing the gaps in each stage of the attack pipeline. Our method significantly enhances impersonation capabilities in score-based attacks, even under elevated decision thresholds. On the LFW benchmark, with a budget of only 100 confidence score queries per identity, our attack achieves an impersonation success rate exceeding 92\% against Amazon Rekognition at a confidence score threshold of 99-recommended setting for law enforcement scenarios. We further observe consistently robust performance across multiple open-source FRSs evaluated at similarly stringent decision thresholds.

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